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S Y P O S I U M
Advancing Nonmarket Strategy Research:
Institutional Perspectives in a Changing World
by Jonathan P. Doh, Thomas C. Lawton, and Tazeeb Rajwani
Executive Overview
Nonmarket strategy is now well established as a legitimate field of research. In this paper, we review the
dominant paradigms in contemporary nonmarket research and report on the key insights and findings from
those perspectives. We use this review to suggest that the integration of institutional and strategic
perspectives provides a logical path for the continued development of nonmarket strategy research going
forward. Looking ahead, our premise is that institutional perspectives will have an increased relevance to
nonmarket scholarship, particularly with the increasing importance of emergent economies to intemational
business. As companies are required to invest more in nonmarket practices, and adapt those practices to
unique country contexts, we anticipate that research will increasingly draw from multiple conceptual
paradigms and perspectives.
This journal symposium has its origin in a panelorganized by two of the authors of this paperfor the Strategic Management Society (2011)
annual meetings in Miami, Florida. The sympo-
sium, titled "Integrating Market and Nonmarket
Strategy: Institutional Perspectives in a Multi-
polar World," represented an effort to refocus re-
search attention on the phenomenological aspects
of institutions and their relevance to the nonmar-
ket environment and nonmarket strategy (NMS).
At the time we were aware of the growing interest
in understanding institutions in nonmarket envi-
ronments, but we believed that the field of non-
market research—more specifically NMS—suffers
from somewhat of an identity problem.
Several traditions and approaches inform the
study of NMS, including research on corporate
political activity (CPA) (Hillman et al., 2004;
HiUman & Hitt, 1999; Keim & Zeithaml, 1996;
Lawton, McGuire, &. Rajwani, in press; Schüler et
al, 2002; Schuler, 1996; Zelner et al, 2009),
public administration (Boyne, 2002; Rashman et
al., 2009), and, more recently, the social and
environmental obligations of firms as they inter-
act with their external stakeholders (Boddewyn &.
Doh, 2011; Husted & Allen, 2010; Yaziji, 2010;
Yaziji &L Doh, 2009). However, these multiple
approaches to the nonmarket raise the question of
how firm-environment interactions vary in dif-
ferent institutional conditions (Henisz, 2000). We
believed that an institutional perspective, broadly
defined, could offer a unifying structure for orga-
nizing and positioning the range of disparate con-
tributions to the study of the nonmarket environ-
ment and NMS.
The institutional perspective has gained mo-
mentum in exploring NMS (Henisz &. Delios,
2004; Henisz & Zelner, 2003). Thus, taking a
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broad institutional perspective, this introductoty
papet seeks to synthesize and integrate some of
these dispatate litetatutes to inform contempotary
sttategic challenges that emanate ftom political
and social actots in nonmatket environments.
The article incorporates some of the relevant in-
stitutional strands in the NMS literature to date,
emphasizing especially the importance of social
and economic institutions in consttaining and
facilitating nonmarket activity. This emphasis on
institutions affords an opportunity to tie together
some of the sttands of the existing NMS literature
while extending that NMS literatute in novel and
innovative ditections. The contributions in this
paper highlight and reinforce the relevance of
governmental and nongovernmental actors at
multiple levels of institutional analysis.
In approaching this opportunity, we atgue
that strategies fot the nonmarket environment
ate—and should be—inextricably and inexora-
bly linked to traditional strategic rationales
and apptoaches, and that many of the theoties
and perspectives that have been used to in-
fotm market-otiented strategies can be adopted
and incotpotated into understanding strategies
fot the nonmarket. More specifically, we suggest
that pairing and integrating the institutional
petspectives, which tend to shed light on mac-
ro-level environmental conditions and chal-
lenges, and traditional sttategy theoty, which
tends to infotm industty, firm, and group behav-
ior, provides a novel and useful organizing frame-
work for understanding the range of NMS per-
spectives. Hence, this article proposes a wider and
more inclusive approach to—and domain of—
strategic management than has typically been de-
fined and applied.
This introductory paper is divided into three
main sections. First, we summarize how the three
main institutional perspectives can be levetaged
to inform nonmarket strategy from a macro/coun-
try/contextual point of view. Second, we review
thtee main strategy perspectives that can infotm
nonmatket strategy from industty, organization,
and individual points of view. We select and high-
light how nonmarket scholars have applied or
largely drawn upon those theories in their explo-
ration of nonmarket phenomena. We then suggest
how the othet thtee atticles in this symposium, to
some degree, combine macro-level institutional
petspectives with micro-level strategy atguments,
hy positioning these papers at the intersection of
these two overarching approaches. Finally, we
suggest paths for future nonmarket tesearch, with
particulat focus on institutional factors.
Institutional Perspectives on
Nonmarket Research
The nonmarket environment differs from thematket environment in several important re-spects. First, the market environment consists
mainly of suppliers, customers, and competitots.
The nonmatket environment, by contrast, can be
chatacterized primarily by the social, political, le-
gal, and cultutal arrangements that consttain or
facilitate firm activity. Second, in the matket en-
vironment fitms typically compete for resources,
revenues, and profits, while the nonmarket envi-
ronment considets broader dimensions of impact
and performance such as ethical behavior, policy
attainment, and social responsibility. Firms are
competing in their nonmarket environments prin-
cipally with private interests within their indus-
tries or across other industries, but also collabo-
rating and competing with political and social
actors.
The strategies developed by firms in the non-
market environment ate a means to effect out-
comes such as superior profits (Baron, 1995; Baron
&. Diermeier, 2007). More important, an NMS
maps the institutional situation to a set of possihle
nonmarket actions, such as building coalitions,
lobbying legislators or regulators, making cam-
paign conttibutions, and providing information to
affect institutions that might defend or create
revenues, while a market strategy maps the indus-
try structute to a set of market actions, such as
pricing, quality imptovements, or product differ-
entiation. Both of these strategies can ptovide a
competitive advantage relative to matket rivals,
but both scholars and managers need to under-
stand the institutional factors in more detail in
nonmatket research.
The nonmarket context also has a darker side,
where corruption and immotal practices can dom-
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inate. This is a result of rent-seeking behavior
often endemic in nonmarket strategy, which can
include everything from legal forms such as lob-
bying to illegal forms such as bribe paying. Dis-
honesty and exploitation can thus determine the
nature of a nonmarket strategy. This is particularly
evident in many emerging markets, where high
levels of corruption are the norm.
There is undoubtedly a reflexive and interac-
tive relationship between the market and non-
market environments. For most firms, nonmarket
forces can affect economic as well as political and
social performance (Baron, 1995, 1997). More
important, nonmarket rent-seeking behavior may
also include other activities such as joining a
political action committee, holding conferences,
litigating a case in court, and mobilizing social
actors to support or oppose a strategic initiative.
Building on this point, we explore the fundamen-
tal question of how NMSs should be developed.
This question is important as it relates to both the
interests and the institutional boundaries of
the firm.
Hotho and Pedersen (2012) provide a compre-
hensive synthesis and review of institutional the-
ory as it relates to international business (IB)
research. Here we draw on that review in our
analysis of how institutional perspectives can in-
form NMS. Hotho and Pedersen (2012) begin by
noting that scholars of politics, law, economics,
sociology, and management have offered varied
conceptualizations of institutions and their im-
pact. Further, they suggest that this diversity of
perceptions "implies that institutional approaches
differ in their explanatory power in that they
address and explain fundamentally difference fac-
ets of social life" (p. 238).
NMS, like IB, is a field that draws on several
disciplines and is concerned with multiple levels
of analysis, and so it is only natural that different
traditions of institutional theory inform NMS
(Hotho &. Pedersen, 2012). We begin by looking
at the multifaceted concept of NMS that still
seems underdeveloped, misunderstood, incorrectly
applied, and inappropriately implemented. Some
scholars would argue that new leaming and devel-
opments in NMS must continue to evolve to be
useful for managers. In that spirit, we offer a re-
joinder to Baron's seminal 1995 article, which
identifies that for managers, the key challenge is
in understanding the political, social, regulatory,
and cultural environment if they are to have a
more strategic approach to the nonmarket
environment.
Building on Baron's (1995) ideas, when we
examine the NMS literature using institutional
theory, three distinct patterns emerge to inform
the NMS fleld. At first glance, the research is
embedded in multiple yet discrete institutional
perspectives and levels of analysis (at times inter-
twined and overlapping) to explain the phenom-
enon. As Hotho and Pedersen (2012) point out,
however, there is a widely understood division of
this literature into three somewhat distinct
strands or streams. In the IB area, for example,
they note that the papers in a 2008 Journal of
International Business Studies special issue on "In-
stitutions and International Business" drew on
these three specific institutional approaches: new
institutional economics (Glougherty &. Grajek,
2008), neo-institutional perspectives (Orr 6A.
Scott, 2008), and national business systems (Jack-
son &. Deeg, 2008), and that is the basic classifi-
cation we adopt here.
Hence, given our IB emphasis, we follow this
three-strand approach in our classification of the
institutional theory literature relevant to NMS.
Rather than seek to be exhaustive in our discus-
sion of each strand, we map the key insights and
their value to NMS, drawing on Hotho and Ped-
ersen's (2012) review. We acknowledge that these
categories are not fully discrete nor discriminant.
Indeed, given that they all fall under a broad
"institutional" school, their overall orientation
emanates from similar traditions, levels of analy-
sis, and perspectives. Nonetheless, we believe it is
useful to examine some of the distinctive contri-
butions of each to NMS, recognizing that these
distinctions are relative—not absolute—ones.
New Institutional Economics
As Hotho and Pedersen (2012) suggest, one dom-
inant institutional perspective that has gained
traction in IB and that is equally relevant to the
NMS literature is the new institutional economics
(North, 1990). A principal feature of new institu-
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tional economics is a focus on the role of eco-
nomic and industrial organization, and the role of
political governance in developing and maintain-
ing these institutional structures, with the effect of
influencing the process of national development
and adaption. New institutional economics argu-
ments can also be found in the NMS field, where
political and regulatory uncertainty shape the
nonmarket strategy choices and market entry de-
cisions of firms (Bonardi, Holburn, & Vanden
Bergh, 2006; De Figueiredo, 2009). Management
studies here have placed particular importance on
national and intemational markets with high un-
certainty, where economic development can
strain traditional institutional arrangements.
As Hotho and Pedersen (2012) observe, the
role of institutional arrangements in economics
drew increasing attention in a variety of disci-
plines in the 1980s and 1990s through the work of
Noith (1990) and Williamson (2000). New insti-
tutional economics suggests that the nature of
exchange processes is dependent on the rationale
of agents, regulations, and specificity of the con-
text. The institutional rules and regulations affect
the profits firms make (North, 1990) and the
productivity of countries and the firms in those
countries (Hotho & Pedersen, 2012). For in-
stance, Singapore is consistently ranked as one of
the most open economies and best places to do
business due, in part, to the predictability of its
political and regulatory system. Gonversely, Ven-
ezuela ranks low in terms of political and regula-
tory certainty, and its economic condition reflects
that status.
Taken from the vantage point of the new in-
stitutional economics tradition, institutions affect
firms' ability to maintain a competitive advantage,
especially as they enter new markets. This is due
to institutional frameworks having various im-
pacts—particularly added cost and increased un-
certainty—on firms setting up new operations in
home or host countries. Dependable, stable, and
predictable host country institutions, therefore,
help to reduce economic costs and level of uncer-
tainty (Hotho & Pedersen, 2012; North, 1990).
They also contribute to creating strong capital
markets (Hillman, Zarkhoodi, &. Bierman, 1999).
However, the quality of the institutional frame-
works depends on the experience of ñrms with
policy makers and the opportunity firms have to
learn from others in the nonmarket environment
(Bonardi et al., 2006). Ring, Lenway, and
Govekar (1990) further suggested that the effect
of the institutional environment on the firm is
also a function of industry structure. In essence,
the nature of the industry, including its hierarchy
and competitive structures, further determines the
impact of the institutional context on individual
firms. Gonsequently, strategies deployed by man-
agement are a function of the degree of institu-
tional impact on the firm and the firm's strategic
predisposition toward the nonmarket environ-
ment (Ring et al., 1990). As Jacobson, Lenway,
and Ring (1993) suggested, the ways managers of
multinational enterprises (MNEs) structure eco-
nomic transactions will limit the costs resulting
from institutional interventions. They argued that
the traditional focus on the dyadic relationship
between supplier and buyer misses sources of
transaction costs. This is important because con-
ceptualizing economic transactions as embedded
in a nonmarket context will help firms maintain
their position and competitiveness.
Neo-lnstitutionalism
Reflecting a general understanding of the three
institutional traditions, Hotho and Pedersen
(2012) introduce a second institutional perspec-
tive as neo-institutionalism, sometimes referred to
in institutional or organizational sociology. This
tradition places primary emphasis on social struc-
tures and relationships that occur within societ-
ies—both formal and informal—and how these
structures define and shape broader systems and
the role of organizations within them. These ex-
ternal social pressures produce tendencies for or-
ganizations to resemble one another; as DiMaggio
and Powell (1983, p. 148) said, "There is such
startling homogeneity in organizational forms and
practices." In this example, a given ecosystem of
firms adopts isomorphic NMS to respond to com-
mon institutional pressures and in so doing influ-
ences political actors collectively (Lawton & Raj-
wani, 2011). Subsequently, the national-level and
subnational-level pressures maintain diversity in
those NMSs adopted by firms, as seen in Table 1,
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Table 1
Institutional Perspectives on Nonmarket Research
New institutional
economics
Neo-institutionol
perspectives
Nationol business
systems
Level of atialysis
Intematiotial/national
Bonordi etal. (2006)
Delios and Henisz (2003)
Hillman etal. (1999)
Jacobson etal. (1993)
Ring etal. (1990)
National/subnafional/
non-national
Boddewyn and Doh (2011)
Yazi¡i(2010)
Scherer and Palozzo (2011)
Getz(1997)
Iniernolional/cross-natíonal
Sun et al. (2010)
HallandSoskice(2001)
Jackson and Deeg (2008)
Khanna and Palepu (2005)
Whitley(1999)
Key insight
Political and regulatory uncertainty
shapes firms' nonmarket strategy
choices and market entry decisions.
Social farces enable and canstrain the
political actors charged with
enacting and enforcing public
policies.
Variations in political-economic models
require attention to differences in
actor and stakehalder interests.
Example
Singopare is consistently ranked as one of the most open
economies and best places to do business due to the
openness and predictability of its political and regulatory
system. Conversely, Venezuela ranks low in terms of
political and regulatory certainty, and its economic fortunes
are similarly affected.
Civil society norms and NGO actions dictóte the investment
climate and policies of government and therefore shape
foreign market choices of firms. For instance, setting up a
factory in Germany is mare expensive and time-consuming
than doing so in Turkey, involving greater civil society input
and influence.
Chinese firms entering Europe acknowledge the regulatory
uniformity created hy EU membership but can take
advantage af the variances that occur in individual country
markets due to different tax regimes and labor laws.
unlike the comparative capitalism and national
business systems perspectives.
NMS studies using neo-institutional perspec-
tives consider the social obligations—and strate-
gies—of firms as they interact with their external
stakeholders (Boddewyn &. Doh, 2011; Husted &.
Allen, 2010; Yaziji, 2010; Yaziji & Doh, 2009).
We find that conceptualizing NMS with stake-
holders or social actors reaffirms its place in the
institutional field. More important, NMS has fully
included key stakeholders, going so far as to ex-
plain the enforcement of public policies. There-
fore, instead of firms being seen as the product of
socially prescribed and institutional pressures,
they are seen as social structures that exert agency
and pressure on their institutional environment.
Civil society norms and actions dictate the
investment climate and policies of govemment
and therefore shape firms' foreign market choices.
For example, establishing a business may be more
expensive in a m.ore developed economy than in
an emerging one because of the various actors
involved. A key element of this neo-institutional
perspective is that societal actors have demonstra-
ble effects on the competitive advantage of firms
and the competitive dynamics of industries and
can affect profitability (MacAvoy, 1992). NMS
scholars have offered a variety of theoretical
routes to address the role of civil society (Ya.ziji &
Doh, 2009). The neo-institutional scholars within
the NMS field have addressed issues around re-
sponsibility of social and political actors. More
specifically, the responsible behaviors here refer to
the kind of effects of responsible social relation-
ships with specific actors that affect firm
performance.
Firms are viewed not as separate from but as
embedded within the social environment in
which they operate (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Hol-
bum & Vanden Bergh, 2008). Here, some NMS
scholars have viewed interactions with institu-
tional actors as obstacles to be avoided or over-
come (Getz, 1997). Scherer and Palazzo (2011)
used the term "political CSR [corporate social
responsibility]" to describe the growing role of
private firms as active participants in emerging
forms of global governance. This role is not
new—at least not for Westem multinationals. Re-
searchers studying NMS are increasingly inter-
ested in understanding how firms from emerging
markets deal with social forces that constrain po-
litical actors and influence policy outcomes.
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Firms often do not fully understand or know
how to deal with institutional forces that affect
political actors and therefore respond with NMSs
that may be obsolete or ineffective. An example
can be seen in the difficulties British Airways
(BA) faced because of European Commission de-
mands during its initial moves toward a merger
with American Airlines. These demands—specif-
ically to sell a sizable number of landing slots at
Heathrow Airport—had been underestimated by
BA. BA's overconcentration on British regulatory
authorities (versus those in the United States and
at the supranational level) meant that the com-
pany neglected to build and leverage an active
political relationship with the increasingly asser-
tive European supranational authority. Conse-
quently, the airline's slow adaptation to the shift
in authority from London to Brussels hampered its
strategic moves to build global competitive
advantage.
Moreover, the institutional conditions and un-
derlying philosophy of a region or country may
determine firms' preferred approach to NMS. For
instance, the European Union (EU) and the
United States have fundamentally different ap-
proaches to creating and enforcing competition
rules. This is due to the EU's primary emphasis on
consumer interests and protection, compared with
the U.S.'s chief concern with a level playing field
for companies to compete. U.S. firms such as
American Airlines, GE, Honeywell, and Mi-
crosoft have all fallen foul of this difference in
emphasis, with the European Commission basing
its competition policy decisions more on con-
sumer choice impact than on business imperatives
and corporate logic.
National Business Systems
The third dominant institutional theory perspec-
tive is the national business systems approach to
NMS (Whitley, 1999, 2007), a perspective that
overlaps somewhat with the previous two views,
but focuses on a somewhat different—and more
specific—set of questions, namely to explain the
persistence of differences among national eco-
nomic systems. In the 1990s, some institutional
studies attempted to explain why internationally
based patterns of economic and social factors per-
sisted (Hall & Soskice, 2001). They did so by
stressing the importance of differences in actor
and stakeholder relationships cross-nationally,
and how this power variation is used through
formal and informal institutions (Djelic, Noote-
boom, & Whitley, 2005).
NMS scholarship remains hobbled by a thin
account of institutions and their effect on business
performance, especially in understanding the im-
pact of institutional differences across jurisdic-
tions and the impact of these differences on per-
formance (Jackson &. Deeg, 2008). Even explicitly
comparative studies develop only a superficial un-
derstanding of how different institutions and their
contexts interact with firms—what Jackson and
Deeg referred to as generic conceptions of influ-
ences that exist across all institutional settings
(2008). This is problematic due to sociopolitical
structures that help give an account of the non-
market environment faced by firms. Governments
worldwide are responsible for inputs to a national
business system (human capital through school-
ing; resource use through legal systems), and the
current lack of sophisticated study of these insti-
tutional arrangements prevents scholars from ap-
preciating how, for example, Brazil or India devel-
ops world-class firms.
Overall, research focused on national business
systems tries to explain why, in an era of global-
ization, distinctive, nationally based patterns of
economic life persist. Moreover, studies using this
perspective have sought to identify distinct forms
of national business systems and understand their
resilience in the face of the homogenizing pres-
sures of globalization (Whitley, 1999). They have
done so by stressing the importance of power in
social relationships in developing NMS and how
this power is used through formal and informal
institutions (Djelic et al., 2005). Other studies
have built on the political relationships by incor-
porating a national business systems approach into
their analysis (Sun, Mellahi, &. Thun, 2010; Sun,
Wright, & Mellahi, 2010). For instance. Sun et al.
(2010) identified the mechanisms of how political
embeddedness interacts with national business
systems in determining competitive advantages.
Their longitudinal study unravels the mechanisms
that lead to the declining, and even negative.
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value of foreign investors, strengthening political
emheddedness in the Chinese economy because of
changing status and legitimacy of local political
actots with whom these firms have developed ties.
Many papers using this perspective identify the
comparative nature of business systems. Jackson
and Deeg's (2008) call for more comparative work
revolved mainly around greater awareness of in-
temational settings, specifically that Japanese and
European institutional settings need to be cross-
examined. The work on emerging markets has
tended to concentrate on how institutional voids
shape firm development and operations (Khanna
&. Palepu, 2005). Other comparative work has
drawn attention to the political role of Western
firms as providers of community services (e.g.,
education and social services) in emerging mar-
kets (Boddewyn & Doh, 2011). Peng (2003) and
Dieleman and Sachs (2008) noted that the weak
or fluid natute of institutions in emetging matkets
suggests that political activity fot firms revolves
around social networks and the exploitation of
family ot other social connections.
This is a complex intemational ptocess, as the
work of Dieleman and Boddewyn (2012) shows.
In studying the telationship of the Salim
Group—a large Indonesian husiness group—with
the Suharto tegime, they noted the complex in-
ternal arrangements within the gtoup designed to
manage multiple facets of its relations with the
Indonesian govemment. This work draws atten-
tion to the potential liabilities of political ties and
the need fot emerging market firms to create buff-
eting mechanisms to insulate the fltm ftom ad-
verse effects if the political situation becomes less
favorable. Table 1 captures the thtee distinct in-
stitutional petspectives previously outlined and
indicates how each informs the field of NMS
research.
Strategy Perspective on NMS Research
The preceding section illustrates our focus oninstitutional effects at different levels, high-lighting three cross-cutting theoretical strands
that underpin the strategy perspectives on and
approaches to nonmarket research. The role and
impact of institutions on strategy vary depending
on home or host country, industry, strategic group.
and firm specificity. In strategy theory, we also
identify three dominant vatiants that allow us to
delineate the opetationalization of NMS. These
perspectives are industrial organization, resource-
based, and network. Much of the wotk in NMS
studies dtaws on one ot more of these theotetical
approaches, implicitly or explicitly intertwining
them with some sort of institutionalism. We elah-
otate on each of these petspectives in the next
sections.
Industrial Organization Perspective
Much of the tesearch in NMS adopts an industtial
otganization (10) lens. Beginning with the classic
Mason (1939) and Bain (1968) perspectives on
industrial organization, strategy scholats, notably
Portet (1980), have argued that industry com-
position and dynamics are critical variables to
understanding competitive success. Although Pot-
tet's five-force model did not explicitly acknowl-
edge the tole of govemment, he and othets did
note how govemment could influence a number
of the fotces, for example, by creating higher bar-
riers to entry through regulation or other means.
In his subsequent work, which applied industtial
organization theory to national economies. Porter
(1990) fully acknowledged the tole of govem-
ment, especially in stimulating development of
industries to help them become nationally and
then glohally competitive.
Public policy, regulation, and social preferences
affect the overall atttactiveness of an industry and
the competitive forces and dynamics within it.
More important, studies have leveraged formal
economic models of NMS to incorporate repeated
rounds of strategic choices and political uncer-
tainty, with the ptimary role of NMS being shap-
ing initial expectations and thus influencing the
joint market and nonmarket equilibrium choices
of the fitm (Baron, 2001). Baron (1997) suggested
that firms can overcome political uncertainty and
the liabilities associated with specific industries in
the political and regulatory environment by de-
veloping specific NMS—lobbying, campaign con-
tributions, and so on—to influence regulatory de-
cisions. According to Baron, firms sometimes opt
fot international expansion rather than ptoduct
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diversification due to intensified competition and
significant industry regulation.
The ncnmarket environment highlights that
govemments, activists, and the media have be-
come adept at holding companies to account for
the social consequences of their actions. In re-
sponse, IO studies have looked at NMS as being
an inescapable priority for business leaders in ev-
ery country (Baron, 1995). Strategic theories of
GSR (McWilliams, Siegel, &. Wright, 2006),
which assert that a company's social practices are
integrated into its business and corporate-level
strategies, are integral to NMS. Baron (2001)
coined the term "strategic GSR" and argued that
companies compete for socially responsible cus-
tomers by explicitly linking their social contribu-
tions to product sales. The strategic perspective on
GSR underscores the potential benefits of being
viewed as a good corporate citizen and the poten-
tial differential effects on flrms with different
characteristics and profiles. Reinhardt (1999) ex-
plicated these opportunities with respect to envi-
ronmental strategies, building on Porter (1980) to
introduce three basic approaches to strategic GSR:
a product differentiation strategy, a low-cost strat-
egy, and a strategic interaction strategy. Only the
strategic interaction strategy falls within the area
of nonmarket strategy. The other two fall squarely
within the realm of market strategy, but highlight
the importance of this area for firms.
More recently, scholars concerned with the
industry environment for NMS have questioned
why firms encounter difficulties in developing
strategies to address the regulatory and social ele-
ments of their given industry and market contexts.
Porter and Kramer (2002) proposed that the main
cause of this difficulty is a divergence of economic
interests and ethical objectives in business opera-
tions. Although Porter and Kramer (2002, 2006,
2011) did not use the term "nonmarket strategy,"
they did argue that value chain opportunities that
can benefit society and/or the environment can
also create market opportunities. They noted that
the tension between these different goals is com-
mon in highly regulated industries. More funda-
mentally, lack of empirical conflrmation of a pos-
itive correlation between the two is a causal factor
in the strategic failure of companies to address the
interplay and impact.
Porter and Kramer (2002, 2006) argued that
corporate philanthropy—an NMS—could be bet-
ter aligned with GSR practices and leveraged
more effectively to enhance a firm's competitive
advantage. They posited that philanthropy strat-
egy should not be used solely as a way to enhance
the firm's corporate reputation, but should be em-
ployed more strategically. An example of strategic
corporate philanthropy would be a firm supporting
education programs in the local community that
would subsequently enhance the skill base of the
potential future employees available to the firm.
Tata Group has done so very effectively in India.
For example, Tata has engaged legislators to in-
troduce policies that would make books and pen-
cils available for free to every child to encourage
social mobility and economic vitality.
Although NMS can have positive effects on
the firm and its environment, it can sometimes be
counterproductive. This is true for two reasons.
First, NMS may pit business against society, when
in reality the two are interdependent. Second, it
pressures companies to think of NMS in generic
ways instead of in the way most appropriate to
their individual business strategies. Some ap-
proaches to NMS are so disconnected from market
strategy as to obscure opportunities for companies
to benefit society. Porter and Kramer (2006) sug-
gested that if corporations were to analyze their
opportunities for social legitimacy using the same
frameworks that guide their core business choices,
they would be in a stronger position to pursue
their market and nonmarket activities in a more
integrated fashion. They also proposed a new way
to look at the relationship between business and
society that does not treat corporate growth and
social welfare as a zero-sum game. They suggest
that NMS should be viewed as an opportunity
rather than as "damage control."
We argue that the NMS adopted by firms can
be cost-effective and a charitable deed. However,
it can also be a potent source of innovation and
competitive advantage. For instance, the compet-
itive dynamics and growth strategies of airlines are
curtailed by public policy requirements and inter-
governmental agreements on route access and ex-
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pansion. In Western European and North Amer-
ican markets, pressure from civil society has
resulted in more stringent environmental controls
and legal requirements imposed by national, in-
temational, and supranational regulatory author-
ities, easyjet, a leading European airline, has been
influenced and even pressured by these authori-
ties, but has also sought to embed social factors
into its NMS to address and even preempt some
aspects of regulatory influence that constrain its
commercial success. For instance, easyjet is work-
ing with aircraft and component manufacturers to
develop what it has dubbed the "easyjet ecojet,"
aimed at cutting carbon dioxide emissions by 50%
by 2015. easyjet is one of the first airlines to
outline in detail the environmental requirements
that must be met by the next generation of short-
haul aircraft.
Resource- and Capabilities-Based Perspective
An emerging perspective in the NMS field is that
brought by resources and capabilities in firms and
strategic business units. Building on the resource-
based view (RBV) of the firm, the concept of
organizational capability has emerged as a primary
explanatory framework of competitive advantage
(Ethiraj, Kale, Krishnan, & Singh, 2005; Teece,
Pisano, &. Shuen, 1997). A number of scholars
have suggested that firm resources and capabilities
can be integrated into the nonmarket environ-
ment, notably in respect to relations with politi-
cians or regulators (Bonardi et al., 2006; Gapron
&. Ghatain, 2008; Frynas, Mellahi, &. Pigman,
2006; Lawton, Rajwani, &. Doh, in press; Oliver &
Holzinger, 2008) and social actors (Hillman et al.,
2004; McWilliams &. Siegel, 2011), as shown in
Table 2, below. However, some critics of these
NMS studies based on the RBV of the firm have
said they are not paying attention to the manage-
rial coordinative processes and capabilities by
which firms assemble and leverage political re-
sources to build robust NMS (Dahan, 2005).
McWilliams, Van Fleet, and Gory (2002) ex-
tended the RBV theory of the firm to show that it
can be used to analyze the effectiveness of NMS.
They demonstrated that NMS can raise rival costs
by blocking the use of substitute resources. These
resources would otherwise be available to those
rivals; however, by preventing their use through
NMS, the "focal" firm gains an important advan-
tage. An example would be blocking legislation
that might provide a rival with access to an im-
portant govemment contract or "pork-barrel"
project. In related work, we have proposed that
NMS can be viewed from the perspective of the
capabilities literature, and just as is the case in the
commercial environment, differing NM capabili-
ties can contribute to the success or failure of
NMS. We have suggested that it is important to
identify and explicate the NMS processes by
which political resources are integrated and de-
ployed. In particular, firms can—and do—lever-
age their financial, human, and network resources
to support their NMS strategy. An example is
when a firm mobilizes a broad company-wide cam-
paign (e.g., a charitable project) that leverages the
entire company and its constituent business units
and employees, and in so doing bolsters legitimacy
in communities in which it works (Lawton et al.,
in press; Lawton & Rajwani, 2011; Pearce &
Doh, 2005).
Even before the application of RBV theory to
inform NMS, the idea of nonmarket resources had
been acknowledged in the literature. Fainsod
(1940) suggested that an industry obtains favor-
able regulation through its capacity to mobilize
three kinds of resources: financial (political cam-
paign financing), human (the use of lobbyists and
lawyers), and political (political coalition build-
ing). More recently, Dahan (2005) described non-
market capabilities as being mainly technical-eco-
nomic expertise in lobbying govemment (i.e.,
technical, political, or economic). Nonmarket re-
sources are characterized as having organizational
attributes (an in-house office or permanent regu-
latory person), public image qualities (perception
of stakeholders), reputation resources (individual
and firm responsibility), and financial commit-
ment (direct finance, political campaign contri-
butions or indirect finance, events, and confer-
ences) (Dahan, 2005). Most research to date,
however, has failed to address the potential col-
lective nature of these nonmarket resources.
Moreover, the notion of assembling specific re-
sources and skills was initially mentioned by
Yoffie and Bergenstein (1985), who spoke of how
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Table 2
Strategy Perspectives on Nonmarket Research
Industrial organization
perspective
Resource and
copabilities
perspective
Network perspective
Level of onalysis
Industry/firms
Porter and Kromer (2002)
Porter and Kramer (2006)
Baron (1997,2001)
Firm/SBU
Capron and Châtain (200B)
McV^illiamsetal.(2002)
Oliver and Holzinger (2008)
Firm/sfrategic group
Frynas etal. (2006)
Mahon etal. (2004)
Rowley etal. (2000)
Key insight
Public policy, regulation, and social
preferences affect the overall
attractiveness of on industry and the
campetitive forces and dynamics
within it.
Firm-level approaches to configuring,
combing, and deplaying political
resources enable them to adapt to,
anticipate, and even shope changes
in the corporate political and social
environment.
Corporate political ties constitute one
type of boundary-spanning personal
and institutional linkages between
firms and governmental/social
agents thot enable a firm to acquire
or retain a competitive advantage.
Example
The competitive dynamics and growth strotegies of
airlines are curtailed by public policy requirements
and intergovernmental agreements on route access
and expansion. In Western European and North
American markets, pressure from civil society has
resulted in more stringent environmental controls
and legal requirements imposed by notional,
international, and supranational regulatory
authorities.
Gaogle and Wikipedia collected online signatures and
leveraged this stakeholder resource to force
congressional sponsors of the controversiol Stop
Online Piracy Act, or SOPA, to withdrow their support
for this legislation in the U.S. Congress.
When German trade and retail group Metro Cosh and
Carry entered Russia, the persanal ties fostered in
odvonce with the then-mayor of Moscow, Yuri
Luzhkov, facilitated their preferential market entry
and expansion.
firms accumulate nonmarket capital. As a result,
we believe that the RBV theory is very useful in
our understanding of the configurations and com-
binations of nonmarket resources to create polit-
ical weight in NMS.
Some NMS studies show how resources are
leveraged by large organizations within a wide
range of industries, including oil and gas (Frynas
et al., 2006), electronics (Lawton, 1996; Yoffie &
Bergenstein, 1985), and air transport (Lawton,
1999). Oliver and Holzinger (2008) used the
NMS perspective with RBV theory to examine
the capacity of firms to deploy skills and political
resources to successfully manage and influence the
public policy process. In general, however, these
capabilities are developed based on the firm's ex-
perience in a specific country and so may not be
portable across geographies (Bonardi et al., 2006).
NMS capabilities may also include the aptitude to
find political resources and patterns of behavior in
different types of institutional environments, to
correctly assess the source and nature of expropri-
ation hazards, and to successfully negotiate with
political and regulatory actors (Bonardi et al.,
2006). For instance, Google and Wikipedia col-
lected online signatures to force congressional
sponsors of the controversial Stop Online Piracy
Act, or SOPA, to withdraw their support for this
legislation in the U.S. Congress.
Network Perspective
The third viewpoint is the network perspective,
which explores strategic responses to institutional
changes using relationships. Network ties in the
nonmarket are boundary-spanning personal and
institutional linkages between firms and govern-
mental agents that tend to enable a firm to acquire
or retain a competitive advantage. Typically,
gaining networks or nonmarket capital from the
political and social systems is important for any
business firm. Interactions with govemment offi-
cials can provide firms with unique information
about governmental processes that are often oth-
erwise difficult and expensive to obtain (Frynas et
al, 2006; Hillman et al., 1999). In addition, non-
market capital may improve a firm's access to the
policy-making process; for example, firms may be
invited to testify before Congress or appointed to
key policy advisory committees. Nonmarket cap-
ital also augments a flrm's political and social
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reputation and therefore increases its consider-
ation in the -legislative and regulatory processes.
Clearly, having nonmarket capital enables a firm
to be more effective in the political and social
process. Such access makes outcomes favorable to
the firm more likely and may lead to improved
financial performance.
One area that has been gaining momentum in
the NMS literature is the role of nonmarket cap-
ital within business-government relations. There
have been some important discussions of social
capital within the political context (Brehm &
Rahn, 1997) and some references to political cap-
ital in management literature (Shaffer &. Hillman,
2000). However, there is little consensus about
how nonmarket capital operates within the non-
market sphere. Because the construct has multiple
applications at the firm and strategic group levels
of analysis, the operationalization of nonmarket
capital poses significant challenges.
Building on Shaffer and Hillman (2000), we
define nonmarket capital as the ability of firms to
influence political and social actors and agendas
using reputation, relationships, expertise, and fi-
nance. Some scholars have suggested that social or
reputational capital is a specialized type of non-
market capital (Oliver & Holzinger, 2008). Draw-
ing from Nahapiet and Ghoshal's (1998) opera-
tionalization of social capital, Shaffer and Hillman
(2000, p. 178) stated that nonmarket capital en-
tails resources "embedded within, available
through and derived from the network of relation-
ships possessed by a social unit." Another compo-
nent of nonmarket capital is a firm's investment in
the capability to implement effective NMS by
developing access to decision makers, knowledge,
and expertise (Frynas et al., 2006). Other studies
equate nonmarket capital more closely with the
benefits derived from relationships such as politi-
cal influence, access to policy makers, and in-
creased knowledge about public policy arenas
(Mahon, Heugens, & Lamertz, 2004).
The initial step for corporations interested in
creating nonmarket capital is to form ties with
elected officials. A tie is characterized by the
frequency of interaction between partners and
their resource commitment (Rowley, Behrens, &.
Krackhardt, 2000). Firms must decide whether it
is strategically advantageous to form a weak or a
strong tie. Weak ties involve less of a resource
commitment, are less frequent, and constitute
more of an arm's-length transaction. Economic
examples include marketing agreements and li-
censing and patent agreements between compa-
nies (Rowley et al., 2000). Strong ties involve
greater resource commitments and more frequent
interactions. Partners have to invest in these re-
lationships before they yield any benefits. Equity
alliances and joint ventures, for example, repre-
sent market transactions with strong ties (Rowley
et al, 2000).
The decision to form a weak or a strong tie with
an elected official or social actor may be based on
an analysis of the different roles that ties play and
the diverse political circumstances that exist. Cor-
porations have a finite amount of time and energy
to invest in relationships, so they have to decide
which approach will be most beneficial (Seibert,
Kraimer, «Si Liden, 2001). There are numerous
advantages to weak ties: They are cheaper to form
(they can form through fairly ordinary activities
such as providing a campaign contribution or
meeting at a social event), are easier to maintain
than strong ties (because they involve less con-
tact), serve a bridging function (enabling a firm to
make the connection between two different net-
works; Seibert et al, 2001), and may be helpful for
understanding trends in uncertain environments
(Rowley et al, 2000). The downside of weak ties
is that the firm is unlikely to receive specific or
detailed information about an issue because it
lacks intimacy with the informant. This may limit
the firm's ability to receive the full offering of
political benefits a politician can provide.
Forming strong ties obviously involves more
time commitment. However, a strong tie with an
elected official also yields strategic benefits. A
firm will receive more information as well as
deeper knowledge of a specific topic (Uzzi, 1997).
Strong ties also enhance trust, mutual gain, reci-
procity, and a long-term perspective (Larson,
1992). In the nonmarket arena, this may imply
that a firm will gain an in-depth understanding of
pending political events or social impacts. In ad-
dition, a firm with strong ties may develop good-
will and a history of reciprocity with elected offi-
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cials that yield other political heneflts such as
political sponsotship and access to congressional
or parliamentary heatings and advisory commit-
tees. Fot instance, when German trade and retail
group Metro Cash and Carry entered Russia, the
petsonal ties fosteted in advance with the then-
mayor of Moscow, Yuti Luzhkov, facilitated its
ptefetential matket entry and expansion. How-
ever, with strong ties, the firm has considerable
time and effort invested with that particulat pol-
itician. The firm may be vulnerable if that official
leaves office, loses his or her position of power
(such as when the majority party changes), ot is
involved in a scandal Table 2 synthesizes the
arguments highlighted above.
Integrating Institutional and
Strategic Perspectives
The previous review suggests that there are con-siderable and unrealized opportunities fot com-bining and integrating perspectives ftom the
three institutional schools with those of the three
strategy petspectives to better inform NMS, both
conceptually and practically. The point of depat-
ture for this symposium research forum was there-
fore our helief that institutional theoty can help
advance NMS research. In this section, we pro-
pose how comhining insights from the institu-
tional petspectives with those of the three strategy
schools can bettet inform contemporary phenom-
ena. In this section, we huild on the overall theme
of integration by briefly reviewing the collective
contributions of the articles in this symposium
and showing how the vatiation in the institu-
tional environment interacts with firm-specific
NMS. Collectively, these contributions link the
broad institutional perspectives we have summa-
tized above to the thtee core strategic perspectives
we have outlined in the previous section. Table 3
presents our summary and synthesis of their con-
tributions, positioning them at the intersection of
the institutional and strategic perspectives, yield-
ing nine overarching themes.
Perspective 1 : New Institutional Economics
Given its broad focus on national-level institu-
tions and their impact on otganizations, the new
institutional economics perspective ptovides a
broad context within which to consider how in-
dustries and firms operate in the nonmarket envi-
ronment. For example, institutional environments
in which industries ate highly regulated or major
firms are state-owned influence the attractiveness
of industries and the relevant pressures and influ-
ences within them. Thetefore, firms' capacity to
build and levetage resources and capabilities is
dependent on legal, regulatory, and govemmental
policies. Futthermore, different institutional envi-
ronments may allow—or prohibit—specific kinds
of lobbying, advocacy, or othet political funding.
Finally, the nature of differing political-economic
systems may favor certain classes of political lead-
ers, making political network telationship more or
less valuable under these differing conditions. We
next offer some comments on the emerging nine
themes (Table 3) and the telative positioning of
each symposium paper (see Table 4) and reflect on
the integration of NMS and institutional factots.
( 1 ) Contexts. One theme that unites NMS and the
institutional environments is context. This con-
struct is an important contrihution made hy all
three of the symposium papers but especially by
Kingsley, Vanden Bergh, and Bonardi, who in-
vestigate NMS in the context of political mat-
kets and regulatory uncertainty using the new
institutional economics petspective. Specifi-
cally, they assess the design of nonmatket sttat-
egies to manage regulatory uncertainty and dis-
cuss ways for firms to integrate these with theit
market strategies. The authots advance a frame-
work for predicting the magnitude of regulatory
uncertainty and develop sttategic implications
for firms to manage tegulatory uncertainty in
the context of theit market investments. They
suggest the dimensions of a nonmarket sttategy
that fits well with the characteristics of the
political matket to create an integrated strategy.
They also provide examples from several market
entry choices that involve diffetent nonmatket
strategies and offet suggestions for futute te-
search in this area.
Henisz and Zelner also explore context but fo-
cus on intemational business. Specifically, they
are interested in the diffeting contexts of polit-
ical tisk, which they perceive as the impetus fot
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Table 3
Integrating Market and Nonmarket Strategy Perspectives: Conceptual and Practical
Complementarities and Synergies
New institutional
economics
Neo-institutionol
perspective
Notional business
systems
Industrial organization
Competitive dynamics within industries are
influenced hy hroad institutionol-
economic conditions ond choices, such as
ontitrust policies.
Social octors express preferences through
investment and purchasing choices that
affect industry attractiveness and the
role ond influence of orgonizotions olong
the value choin. For exomple, industry-
specific labor and humon rights codes
and standords are partly a result of
institutionol pressure from social
movements ond octors.
Differences in notionol business systems
translate into differing industry-specific
competitive environments. For example,
industriol policies favor specific
industries ond creóte opportunities (and
sometimes chollenges) for investors.
Resource-based view
Firms' copocity to build and leverage resources
ond copobilities is dependent on legol,
regulatory, and governmental policies. For
example, different institutional environments
may allow—or prohibit—specific kinds of
lobbying, odvococy, or other politicol
funding.
Firms may be subject to chollenges from sociol
octors that constroin their ability to build
legitimocy and bolster reputational assets
ond/or they moy develop copabilities to
influence those actors to ochieve their goals.
Differences in notional business systems require
the development and deployment of politicol
resources and copobilities toilored to those
differences.
Network perspective
Die nature of differing politicol-economic
systems may fovor certoin dosses of
politicol leoders, moking politicol
network relationship more or less
voluoble under these differing
conditions.
As in the case of the neo-institutional
perspective, the nature of differing
social systems and preferences of social
actors determine network relationship
OS being more or less voluoble under
these differing conditions.
Network relotionships moy toke different
forms, involve different actors, and
yield distinct outcomes depending on
the broader business system in which
they emerge and evolve.
Table 4
Integrating Market and Nonmarket Strategy Perspectives: Positioning Contributions in This
Symposium
New institutionol economics
Neo-institutional perspective
National business systems
Industrial organization Resource-based view Network perspective
Kingsley, Vanden Bergh, ond Bonordi
Henisz ond Zelner
Sun, Mellohi, and Wright
intemational nonmarket strategy research in
the first place. They contend that the actions of
policy makers in other countries can represent
cues about appropriate behavior or experiences
that can inform policy choices. Multilateral
lenders may also influence domestic policy out-
comes through their conditional lending prac-
tices. The authors further emphasize that one
important area for future research is the linkage
of nonmarket and market strategy research in
the shared context of domestic and intema-
tional business.
(2) NMS process. Kingsley, Vanden Bergh, and
Bonardi examine why firm entry decisions
into new geographic areas involve market
risk. They highlight that the investment
may also subject the firm to risk associated
with process in regulation/public policy
that either reduces the firm's profitability or
blocks the firm from meeting other objec-
tives. NMS processes typically lead to di-
chotomized outcomes, resulting in either
uncertain or certain policy implications for
firms. In part the policy uncertainty derives
from the need for regulators to learn how to
regulate new business models and technol-
ogies. A second, related mechanism generat-
ing policy uncertainty comes from the polit-
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ical games taking place among the various
players involved in the regulatory process—in
particular, regulatory agencies, politicians,
firms, consumers, and activist interest groups.
The important point to note is that NMS
process is determined by the various compet-
itive dynamics within the industry choices
but is also shaped by the actors in the network
and the firm's resources.
(3) Resource bundles. All three articles implic-
itly or explicitly reflect a more nuanced de-
piction of relational resources and human ca-
pabilities that are dependent on legal and
regulatory policies. Kingsley, Vanden Bergh,
and Bonardi draw inspiration, at least indi-
rectly, from the notion that firms have heter-
ogeneous capabilities for responding to and,
in some cases, leveraging nonmarket re-
sources to affect institutional environments
Perspective 2: Neo-lnstitutionalism
The integration of neo-institutionalism with the
three strategic perspectives also provides interest-
ing and useful insights for the NMS field. Previous
articles and our symposium article by Henisz and
Zelner demonstrate keen attention to strategic
choice, actcfrs, and structures, which shows how
organizations respond to, and interact with, insti-
tutions and institutional pressures from the three
strategy perspectives. These themes are high-
lighted and discussed below.
(4) Choice. In the case of industrial organization
economics, social actors express their prefer-
ences through investment and purchasing
choices that, in tum, affect industry attrac-
tiveness and the role and influence of organi-
zations along the value chain. For example,
the many codes, standards, and norms devel-
oped to encourage industries to adopt better
environmental, labor, and human rights prac-
tices are primarily a result of institutional
pressure from social movements and actors.
The firms' strategic choices to invest in influ-
encing nonmarket actors are deliberate in ex-
ploiting opportunities in these industries. As
Henisz and Zelner argue, when firms are ap-
parently free to make strategic choices, they
should identify and evaluate options against
the preference criteria and select the best
option to achieve the intended policy
outcomes.
(5) Actors. A common theme across all papers in
this symposium is the importance of social
actors. From a firm-level resource and capa-
bilities perspective, firms may be subject to
challenges from social actors that constrain
their ability to build legitimacy and bolster
reputation, or they may develop capabilities
to influence those nonmarket actors to
achieve their own goals. Take, for example,
the social pressures exerted on Apple to im-
prove labor and working standards among
their intemational contractors and subcon-
tractors. Social institutional pressure could
result in real and meaningful changes in sup-
ply chain relationships among participants in
the electronics and cellular handset indus-
tries. Therefore, the nature of differing social
systems and preferences in social actors can
determine the value appropriation by firms in
those different social systems.
(6) Structure and performance. All the papers
demonstrate the high degree of taken-for-
granted assumptions about firms' strategic
responses to institutional structure and the
consequent impact on organizational per-
formance. Early institutionalism described
flrms as temporary outputs of institutional
pressure without any attention to firm perfor-
mance. However, the articles here demon-
strate keen attention to performance, both
directly and indirectly. Both Henisz and Zel-
ner and Sun, Mellahi, and Wright illustrate
how specific strategic responses can help to
improve performance in nonmarket environ-
ments with high political constraints. We
suggest that in these papers, and in earlier
NMS studies by these authors (Henisz & Zel-
ner, 2006; Zelner et al., 2009), the inclusion
of traditional variables of institutional struc-
ture, together with the addition of national
and supranational political and social actors,
can help to better inform performance
studies.
36 Academy of Monogement Perspectives August
Perspective 3: Notional Business Systems
National business systems studies have sought to
identify forms of business systems and understand
their resilience in the face of the homogenizing
pressures of globalization. The integration of this
comparative approach in understanding distinct
national political-economic systems with strategy
theory can help inform how the same strategic
positions may result in different outcomes, de-
pending on the unique national business environ-
ment.
(7) Competition. In the case of industrial organi-
zation economics, differences in national
business systems translate into differing indus-
try-specific competitive environments. For
example, industrial policies favor specific sec-
tors or groups of firms, but competition can
still create costs for other competitors in those
industries. In a strategic situation considered
by Baron (1997), the total retum to an NMS
includes not only the retum from opening a
rival's market, but also the retum on the
revised market strategy by the rival because of
NMS. The lesson here is that NMS is also
about mapping the institutional national sys-
tem characteristics to a set of possible actions,
such as lobbying, coalition building, or infor-
mation provision in relation to competitive
dynamics. As highlighted by all of our sym-
posium papers, NMS serves the same objec-
tive of maximizing overall profits by partici-
pating effectively and responsibly in the
public process leading to the resolution of
nonmarket issues. For instance, NMS unlocks
market opportunities from different national
business systems, as the firm works on a mar-
ket-opening trade agreement cross-nationally
by eliminating regulation through lobbying
actions to change barriers to entry.
(8) Tie and sequence order. From a network
perspective, the theme of "tie and sequence
order" is an important strategic response in
integrating NMS with the national business
systems perspective. Sun, Mellahi, and
Wright argue for a contingency perspective of
corporate political ties and develop an inte-
grative framework incorporating market envi-
ronment, nonmarket environment, and in-
terorganizational and intraorganizational
factors that condition the value of political
ties. The authors propose operating mecha-
nisms through which network-based political
capital may turn into liabilities for a focal firm
leading to undesired effects on performance.
They suggest that their paper deepens our un-
derstanding of network-based corporate politi-
cal strategy and of its relationship with market
strategy.
(9) Different national systems. Sun, Mellahi,
and Wright suggest that differing national
systems of economic and political organiza-
tion prompt differing political and social net-
works, which must be carefully cultivated and
managed. Interestingly, in dynamic and
changing systems of national institutions,
these network relationships can constitute
both a liability and an asset for firm growth
and success. As was the case in the neo-
institutional view, network relationships may
take different forms, involve diverse actors,
and yield distinct outcomes depending on the
broader business system in which they emerge
and evolve.
Table 3, above, summarizes the potential concep-
tual and practical complementarities and syner-
gies between and among the three institutional
and three strategy perspectives. Table 4 seeks to
position the three other articles in this symposium
within this framework.
Conclusions
The institutional environment is a dynamic andself-renewing system, framed by state, intema-tional, and nongovernmental forces and popu-
lated by corporations large and small, interest
groups, and individuals striving to have their
voices heard (Coen, 1998; De Figueiredo & Tiller,
2001; Lawton & Rajwani, 2011). This symposium
captures the current and significant new direction
for NMS research. In this direction, firms are
viewed as constructs that interpret and elaborate
institutional pressures. The new research is atten-
tive to the economic perspectives of new institu-
tionalism, the sociological perspective of neo-in-
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stitutionalism, and the cross-national perspective
of national systems. Fully realizing the potential of
these dominant themes, future research must in-
corporate IO perspectives, resource perspectives,
and network perspectives to better understand the
strategic responses to institutional factors in the
nonmarket environment. We identify several key
themes that help to inform the integration of
NMS with institutional factors. These themes are
contexts, process, resource bundles, choice, actors,
structure and performance, competition, tie and
sequence order, and variation in business systems,
which all help to solidify specific NMS responses.
In fully acknowledging these themes and new
research areas, and with the increasing global eco-
nomic and political power of Brazil, Russia, India,
China, and other emerging economies, this evo-
lution in NMS thought and practice is rendered
increasingly important for business and manage-
ment. The challenge ahead is for researchers to
build on the progress of these articles by extending
our understanding of firms and managers as inter-
mediaries tD shape and be shaped by institutional
environments.
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